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A great challenge facing future agricultural water policy is to explore the potential for 
transition from the current myopic competitive (common) exploitation of groundwater 
resources to a long-term efficient and sustainable allocation. A number of economic and/or 
command and control instruments can be used by the relevant water authority in order to 
deal with the economic and environmental problems generated by competitive exploitation. 
However, according to previous experience in both developed and developing countries, 
tradable permits seem as one of the most effective and efficient instruments, especially under 
conditions of limited water availability. On this account, the aim of the current study is to 
explore the feasibility and implementation of a tradable permit system in irrigated 
agriculture. To this end, two distinct optimization models are applied and compared: (a) an 
individual farmer’s model (representing the myopic non-cooperative exploitation of 
groundwater) and (b) a social planner’s model (representing the cooperative and sustainable 
allocation). The deviation of their results shows the rationale for using a tradable permit 
system, while the final allocation of the social planner’s model, solved as an optimal control 
problem that maximizes the social welfare under specific water policy objectives, denotes the 
equilibrium state of this system. The two models are then applied in a typical rural area of 
Greece where groundwater is the only source of irrigated agriculture. The derived time paths 
for water consumption and water availability illustrate the significant environmental benefits 
from the future implementation of a tradable permit system. 
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A great challenge facing future agricultural water policy is to explore the potential for 
transition from the current myopic competitive (common) exploitation of groundwater 
resources to a long-term efficient and sustainable allocation. A number of economic 
and/or command and control instruments can be used by the relevant water authority 
in order to deal with the economic and environmental problems generated by 
competitive exploitation. However, according to previous experience in both 
developed and developing countries, tradable permits seem as one of the most 
effective and efficient instruments, especially under conditions of limited water 
availability. On this account, the aim of the current study is to explore the feasibility 
and implementation of a tradable permit system in irrigated agriculture. To this end, 
two distinct optimization models are applied and compared: (a) an individual farmer’s 
model (representing the myopic non-cooperative exploitation of groundwater) and (b) 
a social planner’s model (representing the cooperative and sustainable allocation). 
The deviation of their results shows the rationale for using a tradable permit system, 
while the final allocation of the social planner’s model, solved as an optimal control 
problem that maximizes the social welfare under specific water policy objectives, 
denotes the equilibrium state of this system. The two models are then applied in a 
typical rural area of Greece where groundwater is the only source of irrigated 
agriculture. The derived time paths for water consumption and water availability 
illustrate the significant environmental benefits from the future implementation of a 
tradable permit system. 
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1. Introduction 
Water has traditionally been regarded as a free-access public good. That was true for 
all water uses including agriculture. However, changes in technology, tastes, 
organization and scale proved that the systems built to provide water for irrigation and 
domestic uses free of charge or at heavily subsidized rates, cannot support anymore 
the increasing demands and degraded (polluted and depleted) supplies. The problem is 
most pressing in irrigated agriculture which accounts for more than two-thirds of 
water use. Water cannot be regarded anymore as a true free-access public good, since 
it is not abundant and has to be allocated among users by some type of mechanism. 
The economic literature suggests that allocation mechanisms that use markets and 
prices (water charges or tradable water permits) could help to ensure sustainable water 
use efficient allocation, and provide incentives for the development of water-efficient 
technologies in the long-run.  
 
Tradable permits are commonly considered as one of the most efficient market-based 
instruments for groundwater allocation. Water permit markets could yield the right 
price and lead to the efficient allocation without the need for overall planning and 
management. In a perfectly competitive setting, a permit market would ensure that 
water goes to the higher value use. They are also consistent with the latest EU 
guidelines for water policy that promote the use of economic instruments providing 
water use efficiency and financial incentives.  
 
The present paper examines the use of tradable permits in managing water use in 
irrigated agriculture. We develop a model in which there are two groups of farmers, 
producing each a high water demanding crop. All farmers share the same aquifer and 
thus, the rate of change in the eater table is a function of the total water used for 
irrigation. We assume that all farmers in both groups have the same marginal cost of 
pumping water. However, the crop-water production function differs between the two 
crops which also yield different prices in the market. Within this framework we 
examine two types of aquifer management; one based on a quota system and another 
on tradable water permits. The complexity of the analytical solutions does not permit 
meaningful comparisons, so we resort to an empirical application, using actual data 
from an agricultural region in Northern Greece. We first confirm that both systems 
yield significant improvements over the benchmark case, in which individual farmers 3 
 
are allowed to pump water at rates that maximize their annual income, ignoring the 
future impact of their action on the groundwater levels and consequently on other 
farmers’ as well as their own future pumping costs. Furthermore, the results of the 
empirical application show that the implementation of a tradable water permit system 
yields not very significant benefits relative to a quota system. Although these results 
seem to question the use of water permits systems, they are specific to the 
characteristics of the area examined, which imply very similar marginal benefits for 
the two crops examined.  Given that in addition, the two crops share the same 
marginal costs of pumping water, the small difference in the two systems’ benefits is 
not surprising at all. Augmenting the difference between the two crops, either by 
widening the spread between their prices or their marginal water productivity, or 
imposing a stricter water constraint, yields very significant benefits from the transfer 
to a tradable permit system.  
 
The present paper verifies both theoretically and empirically the urgent need for water 
management in irrigated agriculture. In the absence of any water management system, 
individual farmers could very fast deplete the available water resources. Both tradable 
and non-tradable water permit systems, if well-designed, provide the basic mechanism 
for sustainable water use. However, a tradable water permit system provides always 
higher economic benefits. The economic improvement is positively related to the 
existing differences among the technologies used in the production of different crops 
and their market prices. The more diverse are the crops sharing the same aquifer, the 
higher are the benefits from using a tradable water permit system.     
 
A number of studies have evaluated various water market approaches to improve both 
water quality and quantity management.
1 Although most of the literature focuses on 
the use of water charges, there is some work highlighting the reasoning and the 
importance of using tradable water permit systems. For example, Ballestero et al. 
(2002) suggest that tradable permits may significantly improve water use efficiency, 
while they can also help to confront water scarcity and groundwater depletion. 
Hadjigeorgalis (2009) states also that their use in smallholder agriculture, a typical 
situation in most agricultural areas around the world, is likely to reduce the risk on 
                                                 
1 See for example, Vaux and Howitt (1984), Howe et al. (1986) and Weinberg et al. (1993). 4 
 
farmers’ income. Tradable permits are often considered as the most appropriate water 
policy measure to cope with problems such as the continuous decline of groundwater 
levels and/or the heavy discount on future benefits (Griffin, 2006). Besides, their 
proper use may also enable water planners to approximate the optimal allocation of a 
theoretical dynamic model, recovering thus the potential gains from groundwater 
management (Provencher, 1993).  
 
The main common issue addressed in these studies is the use (or the specification) of 
annual market models for surface water resources, usually without considering the 
long-term evolution (depletion) of groundwater resources. On the other hand, 
extensive research has been conducted during the past 30 years in order to estimate 
the optimal allocation of groundwater over time.
2 Nevertheless, there are no studies 
attempting to combine the above two methods, that is, the use of water markets as a 
tool for optimal groundwater allocation, highlighting thus the need for further 
research on this topic. The present paper attempts to cover this void, by developing a 
model that combines a dynamic optimal groundwater allocation problem with one of 
implementing a tradable water permit system. Both problems are applied exclusively 
to irrigated agriculture in order to determine the optimal time path for groundwater 
use in both economic and environmental terms. Making a step forward from previous 
studies that implied a single homogenous group of farmers, the present paper assumes 
that farmers are divided into two groups according to their main agricultural product 
and their crop-water production function. Farmers’ decisions concerning water 
abstraction and use are supposed to be made annually, based on the current pumping 
costs. Hence, the proposed tradable permit system adopts such an empirical strategy 
by using an annual system of permits, which are granted at the beginning of each 
irrigation period and are valid only during this specific year. 
 
2. The model 
In the following sections two distinct optimization models are analyzed. The first one 
aims to solve the problem of an individual (non-cooperative) water user, by 
simulating farmers’ annual pumping decisions and estimating the associated long-
term economic and environmental impacts. Farmers’ decisions are supposed to be 
                                                 
2 Gisser και Sanchez, 1980; Feinerman and Knapp,1983; Burness and Brill, 2001; Koundouri, 2004. 5 
 
made within a short-time period (every year), without considering at all the negative 
externalities of their actions (i.e. higher pumping cost to other irrigators due to 
lowering of the groundwater level). 
 
On the other hand, the second model attempts to solve the same problem under the 
perspective of a social planner, who aims to maximize the aggregate long-term net 
benefits of groundwater use (during the same time period as in individual farmer’s 
problem). The basic assumption made in this approach is that the social planer is well 
informed about the current and future state of the aquifer (i.e. the groundwater 
resource), as well as of the agricultural markets. The results of this model will be next 
used as a starting point for designing the appropriate economic instruments (tradable 
water permits or non-transferable quotas) in order to achieve the optimal aggregate 
groundwater extraction. 
 
We assume two groups of farmers, each cultivating an area of equal size to produce a 
homogenous product. We further assume that all pumped water is used in agricultural 
activities and particularly to irrigate the two high water demanding crops. 
Furthermore, in order to focus on the relationship between crop yield and water use, 




r,t r r,t r r,t r f(q ) aq bq g =− +           ( 1 )  
where qt is the per hectare annual consumption of irrigation water (m
3/ha). a,b and g 
are the fitting coefficients, determined for each type of crop (r=1,2) and depending on 
climate conditions and soil properties, as well as on irrigation and agronomic 
management practices in the reference area. These coefficients are assumed to be 
constant in our analysis. Farm revenues are then expressed solely as a function of the 
marginal product of water, even though other variable inputs are utilized (Burness and 
Brill, 2001). 
 
All farmers pump water from a single-cell unconfined aquifer (Figure 1), where the 
groundwater resource is determined by a single variable such as the volume of water 
                                                 
3 Similar crop – water production functions have been used extensively, see for example Helweg 
(1991). 6 
 
remaining in the aquifer or the height of the aquifer (water table). Throughout this 
type of aquifer – which is often called “bathtub” – the water table and its fluctuation 
are both considered as uniform (Brozovic et al., 2006). For simplicity we do not take 
into account the drawdown within the well, because it is considered to have a constant 
and small effect on the pumping level during each irrigation period. 
 
 
Figure 1: Water level changes associated with groundwater pumping 
 
Within this framework, the pumping level (zw) in a well is given by the following 
equation: 
wL zS H ( t ) =−               ( 2 )  
where SL  is the height of the ground surface level and Η(t) is the height of water table 
at time t.  
 
Following Gisser and Sanchez (1980), we assume that the rate of change in the water 
table, H(t)   is a function of the total volume of water used in irrigated agriculture 
(total water pumped), as well as of certain hydrological conditions in the reference 
area. In particular we assume that,  
[] t0 c
1
H(t) N ( 1)Q        ,      H(0) H     ,    H(T) H
AS
=+ α − = ≥         (3) 
where Ν is the natural recharge of the aquifer, α is the constant return flow coefficient 
(0 < α < 1), Qt is the total volume of water pumped and used at time t, A is the surface 7 
 
area of the groundwater reservoir, considered uniform in depth, S is the storativity 
coefficient, Hc is the height of the bottom of the aquifer and H0 is the initial (current) 
height of the water table. 
 
We assume that the marginal cost of pumping (MCt), depends only on the pumping 
level,  wL zS H ( t ) =− . Since we neglect drawdown within the well, the pumping 
level is the same as the water level of the aquifer, which implies zero marginal cost of 
the drawdown.
4  Furthermore, we assume a simple linear marginal cost function (Brill 
and Burness, 1994): 
t0 L MC c (S H(t)) =−             ( 4 )  
where c0 is the marginal cost per cubic meter of water pumped, per meter of lift.  
 
3. Individual farmer’s optimization model 
The basic principles of groundwater aquifer exploitation in a typical common pool 
model have been discussed thoroughly in the literature.
5 One of the main results is 
that in the absence of institutional rules (such as water pricing, water quotas, etc.) 
individual farmers’ decisions concerning water pumping ignore the consequences of 
their actions to other water users. Especially when there are many users, each 
abstracting a small quantity as compared to the resource volume, the effect of 
individuals’ current decisions on the future status of the regional groundwater stock is 
considered negligible (Knapp et al, 2003). Therefore, individual farmers pump water 
at rates that maximize their annual income, ignoring the future impact of their action 
on the groundwater levels and consequently on other farmers’ as well as their own 
future pumping costs. 
 
The model used herein assumes that every irrigator in the study area tends to 
maximize his annual income by using a semi-empirical approach to estimate his 
pumping costs. This approach is based on farmers’ ability to assess their marginal 
pumping costs (Eq.4) at the beginning of each irrigation period, just after the first 
water abstractions. In addition, this model assumes that farmers are facing high 
                                                 
4 This is a simplifying assumption. In the more general case, the marginal cost of the drawdown is 
incorporated in the marginal cost. See for example, Martin and Archer (1971) and Gisser and Sanchez 
(1980). 
5 See for example, Gisser and Sanchez (1980), Negri (1989) and Provencher and Burt (1993). 8 
 
investment costs and significant agricultural market constraints that affect their ability 
to deal with higher water costs. Namely, under these assumptions, crop changes are 
not considered as an economically viable solution and farmers are only left with the 
possibility to adjust their water application levels. 
 
Since we assume a uniform water table and a negligible drawdown within the wells, 
marginal cost of pumping water is the same for both groups of farmers. Therefore, 
their final decisions on water consumption vary only because of their different net 
benefit functions (due to the diverse crop-water production function and the different 
market price of each product). Thus, the annual net benefit (NB) for each group of 
farmers is, 
r,t r r,t t r,t r NB p f(q ) MC q Cnw =⋅ − ⋅ −              ( 5 )  
where pr is the market price of each group’s crop and Cnwr is the cost of all other 
inputs, assumed constant and independent of the total water use. 
 
For simplicity, it is also assumed that the two groups of farmers irrigate a total land of 
equal size, M hectares each. The allocation of land among farmers within each group 
is not considered. Therefore, total annual water consumption is Qt=M(q1,t+q2,t). 
Substituting this into equation 3, yields the following discrete-time equation, 
t1 t 1 , t 2 , t
1
HH N ( 1 ) M ( qq )
AS
+ ⎡ ⎤ −= + α − + ⎣ ⎦         (6) 
As already mentioned, farmers’ decisions on water consumption neglect the long-term 
effects on the water table. Thus, each individual farmer selects to pump and use an 
annual volume of groundwater that equates his marginal benefits of irrigation to his 
marginal pumping costs.  
r,t r r,t t MNB 0     p f (q ) MC ′ =⇒ ⋅ =            ( 7 )  
 
Assuming linear marginal benefits, Figure 2 illustrates the effect of the increase in 
marginal cost on qt. Over time, water consumption reduces as a result of the 
continuous increase of pumping costs.  9 
 
 
Figure 2: Optimal groundwater use for each group of farmers during two different 
time periods (years) 
 
Substituting f(qr,t) and MCt  from equations (1) and (4) respectively into equation (7) 
and solving for qr,t, yields equation (8a). Given that total annual water consumption is 






q=    S H
2b 2b p






Q= M S H
2b 2 b p
⎡⎤
⋅− − ⋅ ⎢⎥
⎣⎦ ∑∑                     (8b) 
We derive water consumption for the next time period, qr,t+1, by substituting the 
corresponding height of the water table, Ht+1, from equation (6), into the time-
adjusted equation (8a).  
r0
r,t 1 L t 1,t 2,t
rr r
ac 1
q=    SH N (1 ) M ( q q )
2b 2b p AS
+
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −− − + α − + ⎣ ⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
     (9) 
It should be noted that the optimum individual annual consumption of irrigation water 
at  t+1,  qr,t+1,  is negatively related to the total volume of water used during the 
previous time period, Qt.  
 
Substituting qr,t from equation (8a) into (9), yields qr,t+1 as a function of qr,t.  
0
r,t 1 r,t 1,t 2,t
rr
c
q=   q N (1 ) M ( q q )
2 bpA S
+ ⎡⎤ ++ α − + ⎣⎦                  (10) 10 
 
Although the parameter Ht does not appear in equation (10), it is still indirectly 
incorporated into the water use levels. Summing up both farmers’ groups annual 
water consumption, and multiplying with the total cultivated area M yields the total 
water consumption (abstraction) in the study area, 
00
t1 t
Mc ( 1 ) Mc N
Q=   Q1
2A S 2A S
+
⋅⋅ Ω ⋅ α − ⋅⋅ Ω ⋅ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ++ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⋅⋅ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠










Equations (10) and (11) express the time path for both the individual and the total 
groundwater use in irrigated agriculture as discrete-time functions.  
 
Utilizing the initial condition H(0) = H0, equations (8a) and (8b) yield the initial 





q=    ( S H )
2b 2b p











                          (12b) 
The initial conditions allow us to formulate a first-order difference equation for the 
total groundwater use Qt+Δτ=f(Qt). This equation fits well with the semi-empirical 
estimation of farmers concerning their marginal pumping costs. The difference 
equation can be written as: 
t1 t Q=   Δ Q + ⋅+ Κ                            (13) 
where  0 Mc ( 1 )
1
2A S
⋅⋅ Ω ⋅ α − ⎛⎞ Δ= + ⎜⎟ ⋅ ⎝⎠
 and  0 Mc N
K
2A S
⋅ ⋅Ω⋅ ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟ ⋅ ⎝⎠
 
The first step in solving equation (13) is to find a particular solution, denoted as Qs, 
which is actually any solution to the above first order difference equation. A constant 
over time variable is applied in equation (13) (Pemberton and Rau, 2001), giving the 






                           (14) 11 
 
The associated homogenous equation of equation (13) is t1 t Z=   Δ Z + ⋅ ; hence the 
complementary solution is 
t ΦΔ ⋅ , where Φ is an arbitrary constant. The general 




Mc ( 1 ) N
Q=   Φ 1
2A S 1
⋅⋅ Ω ⋅ α − ⎛⎞ ⋅+ − ⎜⎟ ⋅α − ⎝⎠
                     (15) 
The value of the constant Φ is next found by using the boundary condition (equation 
(12b)) and thus the final solution concerning the time path of the aggregate 




NM c ( 1 ) N
Q =   Q 1           t 1,2,...T
12 A S 1
⋅⋅ Ω ⋅ α − ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ +⋅ + − = ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ α− ⋅ α− ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
            (16) 









ab ab 2 N
HS
c( 1 ) M c
2N M c ( 1 )
   Q 1        t 1,2,...T
Mc 1 2A S
+
=− − +
⋅Ω α− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅Ω
⎛⎞ ⋅⋅ Ω ⋅ α − ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ +⋅ + ⋅ + = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⋅⋅ Ω α − ⋅ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠
              (17) 
 
4. Social planner’s optimization model 
Contrary to the myopic and competitive behavior of individual farmers concerning the 
use of groundwater, the social planner’s objective is to choose a groundwater resource 
allocation that maximizes the aggregate long-term net benefit. Moreover, this 
allocation should guarantee a minimum stock of groundwater at the end of the 
planning period. We assume that the social planner has full information regarding the 
hydrological
6 and the agro-economic
7 conditions along the reference area. The model 




The main objective of the social planner is to determine the optimal aggregate yearly 
quota t Q  and then to allocate the volume of water per hectare  r,t q to each farmer in 
                                                 
6 The hydrological conditions include the current groundwater level, the return flow coefficient and the 
natural recharge of the aquifer. 
7  The agro-economic conditions include the market value of agricultural products, the crop-water 
production functions and the marginal pumping cost. 
8 Among them, the most characteristic of these studies are: Gisser and Sanchez (1980), Feinerman and 
Knapp (1983), Laukkanen and Koundouri (2006) and Pitafi and Roumasset (2009). 12 
 
group r (r=1,2) for the year t. In order to achieve this objective, the social planner 
may implement either a tradable water permit or a non-transferable quota system. 
Both systems are analyzed in detail in the rest of this section. 
 
4.1. Tradable water permits system 
Under the tradable permits system, each farmer is allowed to trade part of, or even the 
whole of, his water entitlement with other farmers during the year of issue. For the 
specific case of an annual tradable permit system with two equal-size groups, the total 
water volume used by all irrigators during a typical year t is: 
t1 , t 2 , t 1 , t 2 , t QM ( q q ) M ( q q ) =+ =+                      (18) 
After receiving its water entitlement, each farmer chooses her water use in each 
particular time period. Assuming a perfectly competitive market for water quotas and 
zero transaction costs, efficiency requires that at the equilibrium the marginal net 
benefits are equalized among the two farmers’ groups.
9   
MNB1,t = MNB2,t                            (19) 
Equations (18) and (19) describe the equilibrium state of the system at time t. The 
solution of this system yields the water volume used by each group of farmers at t, as 







Q ap ap 1
qp b
pb pb 2 M
Q ap ap 1
qp b
pb pb 2 M
⎛⎞ −
=+ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
⎛⎞ −
=+ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
                      (20) 
 
The social planner’s objective is to determine the optimal path of aggregate water use 
over the planning period, taking into account the optimal choice of farmers at each 
time period given by equation (20). To obtain this, the regulator maximizes the sum of 
the flow of individual farmers’ net benefits over a fixed time horizon [ ] t0 , T ∈  subject 
to the transition equation on the water level of the aquifer (equation (3)). A fixed time 
horizon is used instead of the infinite horizon, since this concept better fits the 
planning process of a regulating agency (Xepapadeas, 1996). Additionally, the social 
planner has to guarantee that at T, a minimum level of water table Hmin should be 
preserved. Therefore, the social planner solves,  
                                                 





rr , tt t r , t Q(t)
r 0
t0 m i n
max e p f(q ) C (H ) q dt
subject to:
1





⎡⎤ =+ α − ⋅ = = ⎣⎦
∑ ∫

               (21) 
where δ is the discount rate. 
10 
 
This is a formal optimal control problem. The current value Hamiltonian is, 
() () rr , tt t r , t t
r
1
pf ( q)C ( H ) q N( 1 ) Q
AS
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ Η= ⋅ − ⋅ +μ + α− ⋅ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ ∑               (22) 
where μ represents the shadow value of groundwater (i.e. the change in the marginal 
use cost of groundwater as the water table changes over time). This parameter 
differentiates the social from the private optimal solution. Given the current value 
Hamiltonian and assuming an interior solution, the necessary conditions for 
optimization (optimality condition and adjoint equation respectively) are the 
following: 
t HQ 0 ∂∂=                             (23a) 
() 0t HH ( t ) c Q μ = δμ− ∂ ∂ ⇒ μ = δμ−                               (23b) 
 
Equation (23a) implies that the total marginal net benefits from water use are equal to 
the shadow value of the actual volume of water pumped from the aquifer. To solve 
this equation for μ an initial condition should be specified for the shadow value of 
groundwater. In order to reduce the number of unknown variables in this condition 
(there are two unknown variables, t t Q  and Ht), the state equation (3) is used once again 








μ= ⋅ Π−Θ⋅ − − ⎢⎥ −α α− ⎣⎦

                     (24) 
where: 
                                                 
10 For simplicity we choose to express the terminal condition as an equality instead of an inequality. In 
the case examined, this simplification is close to reality since total water consumption will always tend 
to reach the maximum allowable volume and water table will subsequently always approximate the 




1122 12 12 21
11 22 11 22
2 pbpb pp( ab ab)
         ,        




                 (25) 
 
Differentiating equation (24) with respect to time and equating to the right hand side 







δμ− = ⋅ Θ + ⎢⎥ −α −α ⎣⎦

                      (26) 
Substituting μ from (24) and  t Q  from the state equation and rearranging terms gives 
the following second order differential equation, 
00
tt t 0 L
c( 1 ) cN 1N
HH H c S 0
AS AS AS 1
δ− α −α δΘ ⎛⎞⎡ ⎤ −δ − − δΠ−δ − − = ⎜⎟⎢⎥ ΘΘ − α ⎝⎠⎣ ⎦
                 (27) 
 
The general solution of the above differential equation can be estimated by reducing it 





HX e X e S
AS c c ( 1)
ρ⋅ ρ⋅ ⎡⎤ ΠΘ
=+++ − − ⎢⎥ δα − ⎣⎦
                   (28) 
where,  X1 and X2 are arbitrary constants, while ρ1  and  ρ2 are the roots of the 





c( 1 ) c( 1 )
,
2 4 AS 2 4 AS
δα − δα − δδ δδ
ρ= − − ρ= + −
ΘΘ
                 (29) 
















He e 1 S




He e 1 S
AS c c ( 1)
X
ee
ρ⋅ Τ ρ⋅ Τ
ρ⋅ Τ ρ⋅ Τ
ρ⋅ Τ ρ⋅ Τ
ρ⋅ Τ ρ⋅ Τ
⎡ ⎤ ΠΘ
⋅− Η − − ⋅ + − − ⎢ ⎥ δα − ⎣ ⎦ =
−
⎡ ⎤ ΠΘ
Η−⋅ + − ⋅ +−− ⎢ ⎥ δα − ⎣ ⎦ =
−
               (30) 




AS X e X e
Q
1
ρ⋅ ρ⋅ ⎡⎤ ⋅ρ + ρ − Ν ⎣⎦ =
α−
                       (31) 
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Recalling now the allocation of water permits, according to the equilibrium state of 
Eq.20, it is also possible to estimate the annual volume of water used by each farmer 








11 22 22 11
2,t 1 1
11 22
AS X e X e ap ap 1
qp b
pb pb 2 M ( 1 )
AS X e X e ap ap 1
qp b
pb pb 2 M ( 1 )
ρ⋅ ρ⋅
ρ⋅ ρ⋅
⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ ⋅ ρ+ ρ − Ν − ⎣⎦ ⎜⎟ =+
⎜⎟ +⋅ α − ⎝⎠
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⎜⎟ +⋅ α − ⎝⎠
             (32) 
 
4.2. Non-tradable quota system 
Contrary to the above mentioned market approach, under the non-tradable quota 
system farmers cannot sell their water shares to others. Annual water rights are 
granted free of charge and are allocated based on the historical use of irrigation water. 
Specifically, the maximum volume of water per hectare that each farmer in group r 
(r=1,2) is permitted to use during the year t is  
r,t t r,0 qv q =⋅                              (33) 
where, qr,0 is the initial individual pumping water volume, from equation (12a), and vt 
is the water use reduction rate over time (as compared to the initial volumes). This 
rate is the same for both groups of farmers.  
 
Following this allocation rule, the total water volume used by all irrigators during a 
typical year t is now determined as, 
t1 , t 2 , t t 1 , 0 2 , 0 QM ( q q) Mv ( q q ) = += ⋅ +                       (34) 
 
Using equations (33) and (34) instead of the market equilibrium state (20) and solving 
once again the former optimal control problem (21) yields the time-path of the 
aggregate annual allowable consumption of groundwater resources under the water 
quota system. The general form of this function is identical to equation (31). However, 
the time-path differs: (a) in the values of the polynomial function’s roots (ρ´1, ρ´2), 
() ( )
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The decision about the implementation or not of a regulated system of water 
allocation is mainly influenced by the divergence on water table levels between the 
individual and the social planner’s model. The final outcome of the social planner’s 
optimization model, no-matter the allocation mechanism, seems to depend largely on 
the initial water table level and on the environmental (hydrological) targets. 
Specifically, the annual volume of water granted to farmers is mainly determined by 
the desired stock of water resources when t=T.  
 
On the other hand, the decision between tradable water permits and non-tradable 
quotas depends on the additional net benefits (water use efficiency) provided by the 
market approach. Tradable permits are expected to increase efficiency if the two 
groups of farmers have substantially different marginal benefit functions
11. Dissimilar 
crop prices and diverse production functions (mainly in terms of the coefficient a) 
may lead to this condition. Furthermore, when strict hydrological constraints (targets) 
are applied, tradable permits seem to generate higher net benefits as compared to the 
non-transferable quotas.  
 
It should be also noted that the market system offers flexibility, as it allows each 
farmer to make periodical (annual) adjustments to the use of his water shares, in order 
to adapt to potential variations in environmental or economic factors that are 
considered, so far, to be constant in time. This flexibility can also be interpreted in 
economic terms (e.g. higher net benefits of tradable permits during dry years). 
                                                 
11 Marginal cost functions are assumed to be equal in both groups of farmers. 17 
 
 5. Empirical Application 
5.1. Study area and data  
The theoretical model developed in the previous sections is applied to the case of 
groundwater management in the Moudania agricultural region, in Northern Greece. 
The basic criteria for selecting this particular region are the following: (a) agriculture 
is one of the main activities in the area, (b) groundwater is intensively used for 
irrigation and (c) there is a deficit in the water balance of the river basin. It should be 
also noted that the water used for local agricultural activities derives solely from 
pumping numerous wells (more than 800 wells in the study area), the majority of 
which are located in the southern part of the basin (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Study area map 
Current agricultural patterns and practices are extremely dependent on water 
resources, leading thus to a severe over-pumping of the aquifer. According to a local 
water management plan, the annual demand for water outweighs the annual supply by 
5.5 millions m
3/year, causing a steady decline in the aquifer’s water level equal to 
0.6m/year (Latinopoulos, 2003). Table 1 summarizes the main hydrological data for 





Source: (Latinopoulos, 2003) 
Table 1: Hydrological data in the study area 
 
The most needed agro-economic data were collected from the databases of Hellenic 
Statistical Authority, as well as from a questionnaire survey in the area (Pagidis and 
Latinopoulos, 2008). As far as the crop share is concerned, almost 50% of the 18 
 
irrigated area is cultivated with olive trees. In the remaining area, the prevailing crops 
are: orchard trees (30% of the total area), vegetables, cotton and corn. In order to feed 
the data into our theoretical model, we assume that there are only two crops, olive and 
orchard trees, each of which occupies half of the total irrigated area (M=1300 ha).  
 
The restructuring of the area’s cropping plans seems to be an economically inefficient 
solution due to the high percentage of permanent crops (crops that are actually 
associated with high investment costs). For this reason, the potential increase of the 
marginal pumping (use) cost of water is not going to alter the crop-mix of the area. 
Consequently, the irrigation water demand function should be derived from yield 
reductions (i.e. income losses) of the existing crops due to deficit irrigation practices. 
In other words, the water demand functions for both groups of farmers are equivalent 
to the crop-water production functions (equation (1)).  
 
The coefficients ar, br and gr of these functions are estimated according to the local 
climate, soil and crop characteristics, as well as, to water application efficiency and 
irrigation scheduling. They are in fact the result of a regression analysis (linear OLS 
regression) on crop responses to the corresponding sequential reductions of water 
consumption. Crop responses on different water use levels are estimated by means of 
specific computer software, called CROPWAT and provided by FAO (Smith, 1992). 
The resulting equations are presented in Table 2, along with other relevant agro-
economic data. Substituting these data in (5) gives the net benefit functions for both 
groups of farmers. It is worth mentioning that the first group: (a) is currently 
associated with higher economic output (net benefits per hectare of cultivated land), 
due to the higher market price of olives, and (b) maximizes its yield at lower water 




Parameter Description  Value 
Co 
Pumping cost per cubic meter of water pumped per 
meter of lift 
0.0004 €/m
3 
Μ  Total cultivated area by each group of farmers   1300 ha 
f(q1,t)  Production function for the 1
st group of farmers   0.778qt – 0.000058qt
2 + 1440 19 
 
(crop: olive tree) – kg/ha 
f(q2,t) 
Production function for the 2
nd  group of farmers   
(crop: orchards) – kg/ha 
1.501qt – 0.000094qt
2 + 4910 
p(q1,t)  Current price of the crop of group1   1.20 €/kg 
p(q2,t)  Current price of the crop of group1  0.42 €/kg 
Cnw1 
Cost of the other crop inputs (apart from water) for 
the 1
st group of farmers 
2700 €/ha 
Cnw2 
Cost of the other crop inputs (apart from water) for 
the 2
nd group of farmers 
3150 €/ha 
Table 2: Agro-economic data in the study area 
5.2 Results of the optimization model 
A time horizon (planning period) of 40 years (t0 T T 4 0 ∈ = [, ] ,   ) is chosen and used in 
both models; the individual and the social planner one. As already mentioned, the 
individual farmer’s model is based on the hypothesis that each farmer maximizes his 
net benefit for given pumping decisions of other farmers, taking under consideration 
an empirical pumping cost estimation (at the beginning of the irrigation period). 
Substituting thus the data from Tables 1 and 2 into (16), the resulting time path for the 
aggregate water use is, 
t
t Q = 11,620,647 5,922,472 (0.9989)           t 1,2,...40 +⋅ =                (38) 
Likewise, from (17), the time path for the water table height is, 
t
t H =  513.81 573.81 (0.9989)           t 1,2,...40 −+⋅ =                  (39) 
 
From the above equations it becomes evident that there is only a very small decline in 
the long term use of groundwater resources, indicating the limited effect of water 
pumping costs to current and future decisions of farmers. Namely, the annual 
reduction of water consumption in the next 20 and 40 years is estimated to be equal to 
0.7% and 1.4% of the current usage, respectively. Hence, given the current deficit 
water balance, a substantial drawdown of the water table (i.e. a decline of water stock) 
is expected. From (17) the average annual drop of the water table level is found equal 
to 0.59 m (the range of this measure varies from 0.58m/year to 0.61m/year), 
confirming the outcome of the local water management plan (Latinopoulos, 2003) and 
resulting in a total drawdown of 23.8m, at the end of the planning period (t=40). 
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In order to implement the social planner’s model in the study area, we need to 
determine the appropriate discount rate and to set the environmental target of the 
water policy, that is, the terminal value of the water table level. A generally accepted 
social discount rate for this kind of problems usually varies from 2% to 4% (Pearce 
and Ulph, 1995; Spackman, 2006). On this account, a discount rate equal to 3% was 
selected. Concerning the terminal value of the water table, a value equal to 50m was 
chosen (HT=50) to safeguard the minimum impact of the drawdown to the coastal 
areas (i.e. to minimize seawater intrusion into coastal wells). Combining these values 
with the hydrologic and socioeconomic data of Tables 1 and 2, the following time-
paths for the water table height and aggregate water use are obtained: 
Tradable water permit system 
0.001 t 0.031 t
t H 529.57e 4.56e 474.14
−⋅ ⋅ =+ −                     (40) 
0.001 t 0.031 t
t Q 11,620,647 5,285,723e 1,382,069e
− ⋅⋅ =+ −                  (41) 
Non-tradable quota system 
0.001 t 0.031 t
t H 555.94e 4.63e 500.56
−⋅ ⋅ =+ −                     (42) 
0.001 t 0.031 t
t Q 11,620,647 5,312,043e 1,398,829e
− ⋅⋅ =+ −                  (43) 
It is worth-mentioning that, contrary to the individual farmer’s optimization model, 
both approaches followed here by the social planner result in a large variation of the 
annual drawdown (from 0.04m/year to 0.40m/year). This variation is mainly due to 
the discount effect, which leads to higher values at the first planning years and lower 
values at the end of the time horizon. It is also apparent from the equations (40-43) 
that there are no significant deviations in the time-paths generated by the tradable and 
non-tradable permit systems. 
 
Comparing the results of the aggregate water consumption in both models (Figure 4)
12 
confirms the expectation that when decisions are made by individual farmers, 
irrigated agriculture is usually leading to overconsumption of groundwater resources. 
In particular, the excessive water consumption is growing over time, starting from an 
initial (t=1) value of 2.02 millions m
3 (13% more than the corresponding estimate of 
the tradable permit model) and finally (t=40) reaching the value of 5.38 millions m
3 
                                                 
12 The social planner’s model is represented only by the tradable permit system. The reason is that the 
time path of both permit systems are almost identical (their annual variation is less than 0.15%), and 
hence appear as a single curve in Figures 4 and 5. 21 
 
(45% more than the corresponding estimates of the tradable permit model). This 
divergence is partly due to the fact that farmers do not consider the scarcity cost of 
groundwater resources. However, the main cause of this divergence is the social 
planner’s sustainable water management policy, as expressed by means of the 
terminal value of the water table level (Hmin). It should be also mentioned that  
 
The overconsumption of water resources under the individual farmer’s model is 
indirectly presented in Figure 5, where the time path for the height of the water table 
is shown. According to this figure, individual farmer’s model results to an almost 
linear negative slopped function, leading to a water table height equal to 36.2m. On 
the other hand, social planner’s time-path for the stock availability is an exponential 
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Figure 4: Time path for aggregate water consumption at the individual farmer’s and 

















social planner individual farmer
Figure 5: Time path for the water table height at the individual farmer’s and the 
social planner’s optimum 
 
As expected, the dissimilar patterns of water consumption between the two models 
induce significant differences in their economic results, which are illustrated in Figure 
6. Namely, the application of the social planer’s model and the attainment of the 
associated environmental targets may cause a notable decrease in farmers’ income. 
The additional total annual cost (loss of net benefits) of the tradable permit approach 
ranges from € 81,000 (t=1), up to € 496,000 (t=40). These costs estimates are 
equivalent to the 2.3% and 14.6%, respectively, of the aggregate annual net benefits 
in the study area, as calculated in the individual farmer’s model.  
 
In order to examine the efficiency of tradable permits, as compared to the non-
tradable quotas it is worthwhile to compare the aggregate net benefits generated by 
these two approaches during the planning period T. As shown in Figure 6, there is a 
little additional benefit from the implementation of the market system (0.4% of the 
aggregate net benefits). This outcome is not surprising, considering the similarity 
between the marginal benefits in the two groups of farmers. However, this is not a 
general rule concerning the efficiency of tradable permits in irrigated agriculture. To 
support the latter argument, the model was tested under various scenarios of data 23 
 
modification (i.e. different crop prices, production functions and water constraints), 
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Figure 6: Time path for the aggregate net benefits in all three models 
 
Finally, in order to find the time path for the price of water permits, a simple 
expression, recommended by Griffin (2006), is adopted: 
z
t1 t 2 t PM N B M N B == ,,                          (44) 
 
According to Griffin (2006), when many agents (e.g. farmers) are present, the market 
price of water permits is likely to be equal to individual farmers’ net benefit, at the 
equilibrium state. Marginal net benefits can be easily estimated according to the social 
planner’s model (i.e. the tradable permit approach), by making use of the optimum 
individual water consumption (qr,t). In this framework, the time path for the market 
price of water permits is determined as:     
z 0 001t 0 031t
t P 0 0156 0 007 e 0 055 e
− =+ ⋅ + ⋅
.. .. .                    (45) 
                                                 
13 For example: (a) a stricter water constraint: H(T)=60 leads to additional net benefits equal to 1.3%, 
(b) a double price on the crop of group 1 leads to additional net benefits equal to 5%, (c) an alternative 
crop for the 1
st group (with higher marginal  productivity) may lead to additional net benefits up to 10%. 24 
 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the graphical representation of Eq.39. The market price of tradable 
water permits seems to increase in a slightly exponential way through time. 
Specifically, the initial price is found equal to 0.079 €/m
3, while the final price is 
equal to 0.210 €/m
3 (t=40). This price increase is mainly due to the decreasing (in 













Figure 7: Time path for the price of water permits 
 
4. Conclusions  
The present paper analyzed a problem of groundwater allocation in irrigated 
agriculture. On this purpose two different models are analyzed and then compared. 
The first model examined the long-term results of a free access system to groundwater 
resources, under the assumption that farmers act myopically and take short-term 
(annual) decisions concerning water abstractions (use). On the other hand, the optimal 
allocation from the social planner’s point of view was estimated by means of an 
optimal control approach, under the assumption that the final resolution (allocation) 
will provide a feedback to a tradable permit system. Comparing thus the outcomes of 
these two models can help in identifying the potential for a future tradable water 
permit system. 
 
The analysis of the individual farmer’s model showed that the depletion of 
groundwater resources is a very likely scenario when: (a) decisions concerning 
individual water abstractions don’t take under consideration the possible externalities 25 
 
of their action, b) the pumping costs do not constitute a significant component of 
production costs, which is a common phenomenon in Greek agriculture. The 
depletion time depends on the current water balance of the aquifer, as well as, on its 
initial stock (water table) level.  
 
On the other hand, the analysis of the social planner’s model showed that the time 
path of water availability (e.g. the time path for the water table level of the aquifer) is 
determined by the long-term net benefits of farmers, as well as by the desired water 
table level (as defined by the river basin water authority) at the end of the planning 
horizon. A sensitivity analysis on the final water table level can actually act as a 
multicriteria problem with two objective functions: maximum income versus 
minimum depletion. The efficient solution set for this problem can form the basis for 
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However, numerous externalities associated with common property groundwater 
extraction and the myopic behaviour of water users, impede market operation and 
hinder the efficiency of the permit market system. Furthermore, a number of problems, 
affecting the system’s effectiveness, may arise during implementation and are due to: 
the existing institutional framework,
14 the lack of information from the relevant water 
authorities
15  and the excessive transaction and monitoring costs of these systems. 
Addressing these problems, so as to achieve the efficiency potential of tradable permit 
systems for groundwater resources, poses a great challenge for water managers and 
scientists alike. 
 
                                                 
14 For example, free access to groundwater, water rights strictly related to the land ownership, etc. 
15 For example, information concerning water demand, the current water balance in the reference basin, 
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